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Abstract
This paper investigates the welfare and economic stabilization properties of a fi scal transfers 
scheme between members of a monetary union subject to sovereign spread shocks. 
The scheme, which consists of cross-country transfer rules triggered when sovereign 
spreads widen, is incorporated in a two-country model with fi nancial frictions. In particular, 
banks hold government bonds in their portfolios, being exposed to sovereign risk. When 
this increases, a drop bank’s equity value forces them to contract credit and to raise lending 
rates at the same time as they retain funds to build up their net worth. I show that, when 
domestic fi scal policy is not distortionary, fi scal transfers improve welfare and macroeconomic 
stability. This is because fi scal transfers can reduce banks’ exposure to government debt, 
freeing credit supply to the private sector. On the contrary, when domestic fi scal policy is 
distortionary, fi scal transfers cause welfare losses, despite stabilizing the economy. This 
result arises because the distortions caused by funding the scheme outweigh the positive 
effects of fi scal transfers in smoothing the adjustment of the economy hit by the shock.
Keywords: sovereign risk, banks, monetary union, fi scal transfers.
JEL classifi cation: E62, F41, F42, F45.
Resumen
Este documento investiga los efectos sobre el bienestar y las propiedades de estabilización 
económica de un esquema de transferencias fi scales entre miembros de una unión monetaria 
sujetos a choques de riesgo soberano. El esquema consiste en reglas de transferencia 
entre países que se activan cuando los diferenciales de riesgo soberano se amplían. Este 
esquema se incorpora en un modelo con fricciones fi nancieras. En particular, los bancos de 
cada país tienen bonos del Gobierno en sus carteras y, por eso, están expuestos al riesgo 
soberano. Cuando este aumenta, el valor patrimonial de los bancos baja, obligándoles 
a contraer el crédito al sector privado y, al mismo tiempo, a elevar los tipos de interés. 
Este documento muestra que, cuando la política fi scal en cada país no es distorsionadora, 
las transferencias fi scales mejoran el bienestar y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Esto 
se debe a que las transferencias fi scales pueden reducir la exposición de los bancos a la 
deuda del Gobierno, liberando el suministro de crédito al sector privado. Por el contrario, 
cuando la política fi scal interna es distorsionadora, las transferencias fi scales causan 
pérdidas de bienestar, a pesar de estabilizar la economía. Este resultado surge porque las 
distorsiones causadas por el fi nanciamiento del esquema superan los efectos positivos de 
las transferencias fi scales al suavizar el ajuste de la economía afectada por el choque.
Palabras clave: riesgo soberano, bancos, unión monetaria, transferencias fi scales.
Códigos JEL: E62, F41, F42, F45.
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1 Introduction
The debate over the architecture of a robust monetary union attracted renewed interest dur-
ing the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The asymmetrical nature of sovereign interest
rate shocks, coupled with the inherent constraints they pose on domestic fiscal policy, ex-
posed an apparent gap in the design of the Euro area. This gap concerns the lack of fiscal
mechanisms to facilitate the adjustments of individual member states facing idiosyncratic
shocks. With the onset of the crisis, soaring sovereign spreads forced a number of countries,
including Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, to undertake sudden fiscal consolida-
tions. At the same time, contractionary fiscal policy in countries belonging to the core of the
Euro area failed to help boost the economies of the troubled periphery. The dramatic eco-
nomic toll of the crisis and the lack of fiscal coordination within the union led commentators
and policy leaders to propose the creation of a federal fiscal mechanism aimed at improving
fiscal stability of individual member countries while strengthening the Euro area’s response
to shocks.
In this paper I construct a general equilibrium model of a two-region monetary union
where sovereign spreads affect private borrowing costs due to financial frictions. The con-
tribution to the on-going debate is twofold. First, the model provides a consistent narrative
linking sovereign risk to the domestic banking sector. This link contributed to the con-
traction in the supply of credit to the economy seen during the sovereign debt crisis in the
Euro area. Second, I assess the potential benefits of implementing fiscal transfers between
national governments in response to sovereign spread shocks both in terms of welfare and
economic stability. Moreover, I investigate how the conduct of national fiscal policy affects
macroeconomic outcomes under such federal fiscal arrangements.
Completing the Euro area with a fiscal arrangement at the federal level is hardly a novel
idea in policy and academic circles. At the time when policy makers were discussing the
design of the future common currency, it appeared that a system of fiscal transfers crafted to
countervail idiosyncratic shocks would be crucial for its success.1 The arguments in support
of a transfer mechanism drew directly on the literature of optimal currency areas.2 With
the creation of the Euro area, member states would no longer be able to use monetary
policy or the exchange rate to buffer country-specific shocks. Moreover, to the extent that
production factors are not fully mobile across countries and movements in nominal prices and
wages are slow, fiscal policy would become a key instrument to fuel asymmetric adjustments.
On the contrary, moral hazard considerations as well as doubts regarding the effectiveness
of fiscal transfers tilted the debate towards a less ambitious outcome, with the political
compromise reached in the Maastricht Treaty not contemplating the creation of an area-wide
fiscal capacity. After laying dormant for decades until the sovereign debt crisis, political
1Refer to, for instance, the MacDougall report (Commission 1977) as well as Delors (1989).
2Refer to the seminal articles by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1807
implementation of a fiscal stabilization instrument at the Euro area level.3
With this paper, I contribute to this debate by examining and quantifying the effects of
a federal fiscal capacity that is deployed in response to widening sovereign spread shocks. I
focus on a transfers schemes that has governments engaging in non-repayable transfers, with
the government making the transfers funding them through the domestic public budget. The
scheme is embedded in a two-region DSGE model of a monetary union where sovereign risk
affects the cost and availability of credit to firms. During the sovereign debt crisis, the fall
in government bond prices severely weakened the balance sheets of banks in the periphery of
the Euro area and adversely affected their ability to raise market-based funding. With the
increase in borrowing costs, banks were forced to strengthen their equity ratios and, in the
process, to raise lending rates and to reduce overall credit supply to firms. Credit scarcity
dampened investment, which ultimately led to the recession.
To capture this mechanism, I introduce financial intermediaries who take short-term
deposits from households and make long-term loans to firms and to the government. An
agency problem between banks and their depositors forces the former to moderate their
leverage ratios in order to attract deposits. Moreover, because banks hold government bonds
in their portfolios, their net worth is exposed to sovereign risk. While generally the sovereign
is able to obtain funds at the risk-free interest rate, a spread can arise to reflect an erosion
of the government’s credit worthiness. This deteriorates bank’s equity value and forces them
to contract credit and to raise lending rates at the same time as they retain funds to build
up their net worth.
I find that, for a ratio of public debt to GDP of 60%, an increase in sovereign spreads
of 10 percentage points leads to an increase in the interest rates charged to firms of more
that 2 percentage points. The pass-through is reinforced when the share of public debt held
by banks over total assets increases, with interest rates on private lending increasing twice
as much for a similar increase in sovereign spreads when public debt to GDP equals 90%.
Together with the increase in borrowing costs, the drop in the supply of credit to firms
causes investment to drop sharply. At the trough, real GDP falls between 1% and nearly 2%,
depending on the size of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The size of the public debt-to-GDP
ratio also has implications for fiscal policy, with the consolidation effort required to stabilize
the fiscal stance being intensified for higher debt ratio. In addition, when distortionary fiscal
instruments are used to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio, they reinforce the fall in
economic activity. In these cases, the fiscal adjustment required is larger.
The federal fiscal transfer scheme studied in this paper has the potential to increase
welfare in the two regions of the monetary union when funded with lump-sum transfers.
3The 5 Presidents Report (Juncker et al. 2015) is the last high level policy contribution. It draws on and
updates earlier proposals, namely Van Rompuy et al. (2012). The proposed mechanism, to be implemented
before 2025, is to be deployed when domestic fiscal policy cannot, on its own, counteract large asymmetric
shocks. See also IMF (2013) for discussion.
leaders have recently revived the discussion, having launched a road map towards a the
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consumption, labour and inflation volatility being reduced. When the public debt-to-GDP
ratio is higher, sovereign spreads are responsive to movements to the fiscal stance, or when
fiscal policy acts more quickly against those movements, fiscal transfers secure lower relative
welfare gains.
While fiscal transfers can improve welfare when governments use lump sum transfers to
target the fiscal stance, the same is not true when fiscal policy is distortionary. In this
case, the negative effects of funding the scheme cause welfare to fall. It is shown, however,
that fiscal transfers under distortionary domestic fiscal policy can still be used to stabilize the
economy. For instance, when the domestic fiscal instrument is consumption or labour income
taxes or wasteful government spending, fiscal transfers can reduce the volatility of GDP and
inflation, but not the volatility of consumption. On the contrary, when the provision of a
productive public good is the fiscal instrument available to member state governments, fiscal
transfers have the potential to reduce the volatility of all these variables, even if reducing
welfare.
The literature on international coordination using domestic fiscal instruments in countries
that share a common currency has been prolific, with less attention being given to federal
fiscal schemes.4 A recent example is Blanchard et al. (2017), who propose a coordinated
strategy to boost growth in the Euro area based on a fiscal expansion by the core which,
with interest rates constrained at their lower bound, they show can have a significant positive
impact in the periphery. Basso and Costain (2016b,a) depart from the premise of purely
domestic fiscal policy and study how delegation of fiscal instruments to an independent federal
authority affects public debt accumulation and economic stability. Focusing on fiscal transfers
between regions in a monetary union, Werning (2017) provide a theoretical backing of fiscal
transfers as a mean to improve risk sharing in a monetary union even in an environment with
complete asset markets. More closely related to this paper, Kim and Kim (2017) show that
fiscal transfers can improve welfare when international borrowing is restricted. Kletzer and
von Hagen (2000), and Evers (2012, 2015) evaluate the potential of different federal fiscal
arrangements to raise welfare and increase macroeconomic stability. I extend this literature
by investigating the implications of fiscal transfers when the dynamics of the domestic fiscal
stance also matter for economic stability.5
My analysis is also related to works studying the implications of sovereign spreads for
economic stability. Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2011) and Bonam and Lukkezen (2014),
for instance, focus on the interactions between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies,
in an environment where sovereign spreads are introduced as a pre-emptive game between
the government and speculators, as I assume here. Corsetti et al. (2013) study how the
sovereign risk channel exacerbates cyclical shocks when monetary policy is constrained at the
4Pappa and Vassilatos (2007)and Evers (2012) provide references.
5Evers (2015)considers different federal fiscal arrangements from those studied here (fiscal revenue sharing
and a common fiscal budget) and focuses on labour and income taxation instead.
More generally, fiscal transfers are shown to increase macroeconomic stability, with GDP,
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fluctuations. Focusing on the pass-through of sovereign shocks to private lending interest
rates, the channel I explore in this paper, Bocola (2015) and Pancrazi et al. (2015) evaluate
the effectiveness of asset purchases by the central bank for stabilising real activity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
model environment and calibration. Section 3 investigates the transmission of sovereign
spread shocks, while section 4 proposes a federal transfer scheme and assesses its welfare
and economic stabilization properties when governments use a number of different fiscal
instruments. Section 5 provides further discussion and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a model of a monetary union composed of two symmetric regions, which are referred
to as periphery and core. Each region is modelled as a small-open economy featuring habits
in consumption, investment adjustment costs, and sticky wages and prices. Absent fiscal
transfers between the two regional governments, the two regions are linked through trade in
retail goods, through trade in non-contingent bonds, and by sharing a common central bank.
I extend the standard open-economy DSGE model along two dimensions. First, I introduce
a banking sector that serves as a domestic intermediary between savers and borrowers. To
be specific, banks take short-term deposits from local households and sell long-term loans
to firms and to the government. In order to generate a financial friction linking the fiscal
stance to the supply side of the economy, I posit that banks’ intermediation is constrained
by their leverage ratios, which leads them to adjust lending rates and credit volumes in
response to shocks affecting their net-worth. Second, I consider a rich fiscal block, with
national governments having access to a comprehensive range of taxation and expenditure
instruments for the conduct of fiscal policy. In particular, the government levies consumption
and labour income taxes, τc,t and τl,t , and issues sovereign bonds, dg,t, to finance government
expenditure Gt and lump-sum Tt transfers. In turn, Gt consists of wasteful and productive
spending, Gt = ge,t + gx,t.
The remainder of the model can be summarised as follows. On the demand side, house-
holds consume a composite bundle consisting of domestic and foreign produced goods and
supply labour to monopolistic labour agencies. Households can allocate their savings in do-
mestic banks, as well as trade non-contingent bonds with foreign households. On the supply
side, there are four types of firms: (i) competitive wholesalers that use a composite labour
input and capital to produce a non-tradable intermediate good, (ii) monopolistic retailers
that transform the intermediate good into tradable retail varieties, (iii) competitive final
good producers that use domestic and foreign produced retail goods to produce a final good,
and (iv) capital producers that invest in new capital. Finally, the union-wide central bank
sets the nominal interest rate according to a feed-back rule targeting aggregate inflation and
output growth.
zero lower bound and analyse the effects of fiscal retrenchment in alleviating macroeconomic
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The following subsections describe the economy of the periphery in more detail. The
description of the core is omitted for brevity since its structure is analogous to the periphery.
All variables are in per capita terms, and the conventional  denotes foreign variables or
parameters (i.e., those of the core).
2.1 Households
The infinitely lived household is composed of a continuum of measure 1 of household members,
among whom a fraction 1− f are workers and a fraction f are bankers. The former supply
labour lh,t to wholesale firms, while the latter manage a financial intermediary for profits.
Household members switch between the two occupations but keep the relative proportion of
each type constant.
Household members are assumed to pool consumption risk perfectly. Their life-time
utility is given by:
Lwelfaret = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtψtU (ct, lh,t) (1)
with instantaneous utility of the form:
U (Ct, lh,t) = (ct − ct−1)
1−σ − 1
1− σ − ζt
(lh,t)
1+η
1 + η
where E0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on the information available up to
t = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor. Households derive utility from
consumption ct, which is subject to external habit formation  ∈ (0, 1), and where σ > 0
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and disutility from labour, where η > 0 is
the inverse elasticity of labour supply. The terms ψt and ζt represent intertemporal and
intratemporal preference shocks and are assumed to follow independent AR(1) processes.
The budget constraint of the household, in real terms6, is given by:
(1 + τc,t) ct + bb,t + et
it−1
πt
bf,t−1
≤ (2)
(1− τl,t)wh,tlh,t + rh,t−1bb,t−1 + etbf,t − Ψ (etbf,t) + Πt + Tt
where bb denotes deposits with domestic banks, which pay the real interest rate rh,t−1, and bf
denotes non-contingent bonds traded with households abroad and which pay the real interest
rate rf,t−1.7 The term Ψ (·) denotes convex costs incurred on holdings of bonds traded with
6The price of the consumption good, Pt, is used as the numeraire price in each region.
7For ease of exposition, the budget constraint is written such that bb > 0 implies positive savings from the
households, while bf > 0 implies that the household is a net borrower in international markets. Moreover, I
assume that non-contingent bonds traded between the two regions are denominated in units of consumption
in the core.
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foreign households. The nominal rate on international bonds, it, is the set by the central
bank, while πt denotes domestic consumer price inflation. As a consequence of being in a
monetary union, the nominal exchange rate between the two countries is fixed and therefore
the real exchange rate, et, is simply equal to the ratio of consumer prices in each region.
8
Workers receive the real wage wh,t, real profits from firms, Πt, pay consumption and labour
income taxes, τc,t and τl,t, and receive lump sum transfers Tt from the government.
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption, labour, and financial asset hold-
ings are:
(1 + τc,t) ςt =
1
ct − ct−1 (3)
ψtζt (lh,t)
η = ςt (1− τl,t)wh,t (4)
1 = βΛt,t+1rh,t (5)
1 = βΛt,t+1
et+1
et
it/πt+1
1− Ψ ′ (6)
where ςt is the multiplier on the budget constraint and Λt,t+1 = ςt+1/ςt is the stochastic
discount factor.
I introduce nominal wage rigidities as follows. On the supply side, workers are assumed to
supply differentiated labour services to labour agencies. The latter are assumed to have mar-
ket power to negotiate wages with intermediate good producers. In turn, intermediate good
producers use a composite labour input in production, lt, which they obtain by aggregating
the differentiated labour services according to:
lt =
(∫ 1
0
(li,t)
μw−1
μw di
) μw
μw−1
where li,t is the labour service provided by member i and μw > 1 is the constant elasticity
of substitution between labour services. The demand curve for labour service i is therefore
given by:
li,t =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−μw
lt (7)
where Wi,t is the nominal wage agency i charges in order to supply li,t, whereas the wage
index of the composite labour input is given by Wt =
(∫ 1
0
(Wi,t)
1−μw di
)1/(1−μw)
.
8More specifically, et = P

t /Pt.
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When able to so, it chooses the nominal wage Wi,t that maximizes the stream of real dis-
counted profits, ΠW (i), given by:
Max
Wi,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλw)
s Λt,t+s
{[
Wi,t
Pt+s
− wh,t+s
]
li,t
}
(8)
subject to (7) and where wh,t is the real wage paid to workers.
2.2 Banks
I extend the banking sector described in Gertler and Karadi (2011) by allowing banks not only
to provide credit to wholesale firms but also to fund the domestic government. However, I
make two simplifying assumptions: first, I assume that the domestic banking sector holds the
total amount of public debt issued by the domestic government; second, banks do not engage
in cross-border deposits or investment activities. These two assumptions can be motivated
with the following stylized facts. In 2011, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, around
80% of sovereign debt claims on countries in the periphery of the Euro area were held by
domestic banks. Moreover, domestic government bond holdings in the periphery accounted
for 93% of banks’ equity. This home bias in sovereign bond holdings, although not as high,
was also present in the core. These figures had been markedly rising since 2009. On the other
hand, national banks represented roughly 75% of external financing to domestic private firms.
Consistent with the theory proposed in this paper, when sovereign spreads started to widen
in the periphery, from 2008 to 2013, the volume of newly issued loans fell by more than 50%.9
Every period a fraction f of household members are bankers who run a domestic financial
intermediary. They obtain deposits bb,t from other household members and lend funds to
wholesale producers and to the government, ax,t and ab,t respectively. With probability λf , a
banker remains active in the following period, whereas a fraction (1− λf ) f of bankers retire
and become workers.10
Denoting by nt the net worth of the financial intermediary and by Wt the total value of
its assets, the bank’s balance sheet is then given by:
Wt ≡ qx,tax,t + qb,tab,t = nt + bb,t (9)
9The figures are taken from Uhlig (2013), Acharya et al. (2014), and Bocola (2015). Assuming government
debt is only held by domestic households is in line with the empirical pattern for the “repatriation of public
debt” after 2009 in the periphery of the Euro area (See Figure 1 in Brutti and Saure´ (2016)), supported by
the secondary market theory of Broner et al. (2010). A report by the Bank for International Settlements,
BIS (2011), provides a comprehensive discussion on the links between sovereign credit risk and banks funding
conditions. Dedola et al. (2013) extend the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011) to allow banks to
take deposits from foreign households and to lend to foreign firms, generating an incentive for credit policy
coordination between different regions.
10Conversely, each period the same number of workers randomly become bankers.
( )
In each period, only a fraction 1− λw of agencies can adjust their posted nominal wage.
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whereas banks require a return of rx,t on the loans they make to firms. The interest rate on
government bonds, rb,t, is assumed to equal the risk-free rate adjusted by a sovereign credit
risk premium δt+1:
rh,t = Etrb,t (1− δt+1) (10)
where δt is defined below. The evolution of the intermediary’s net worth depends on the
difference between earnings on assets and interest payments on liabilities:
nt = (rx,t−1 − rh,t−1) qx,t−1ax,t−1 + ((1− δt) rb,t−1 − rh,t−1) qb,t−1ab,t−1
+rh,t−1nt−1 (11)
The objective of bankers is to maximize their expected terminal net worth:
Nt = E0
∞∑
s=0
(1− λf )λsfβs+1Λt,t+1+snt+1+s (12)
To the extent that the expected discounted returns on their assets are higher than the risk-
free rate, bankers will want to raise deposits and build their net worth indefinitely. However,
a moral hazard problem between depositors and bankers limits banks leverage. This occurs
because, at any given period, bankers can divert a fraction ι of available assets. Having
knowledge of this, depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy, but can only recover the
remaining 1−ι of funds. Hence, depositors will only supply funds to the bank if the following
incentive-compatibility constraint is satisfied:
Nt ≥ ιWt (13)
that is, the value of carrying on doing business must be higher than the value of diverting
funds. Due to this constraint on the ability of banks to raise external funds, the risk premium
on loans may be positive.
To solve the banker’s problem, I define first the leverage ratio of the financial intermediary,
φt, as:
φt =
Wt
nt
(14)
I then proceed by guessing and verifying that Nt = νtWt + ηtnt, where νt is the marginal
value of expanding assets, holding nt constant, and ηt is the marginal value of the bank’s
net worth, holding its portfolio Wt constant. After some algebra, it can be shown that the
expressions for νt and ηt are given by:
ηt = E0Ωt,t+1rh,t (15)
where qj,t is the relative price of claim aj,t. Depositors charge the real interest rate rh,t,
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νt = Ωt,t+1
(
(rx,t − rh,t)− (rx,t − rb,t (1− δt+1))αWt
)
(16)
where αWt = qb,tab,t/Wt is the share of government debt in the bank’s portfolio and Ωt,t+1 is
the banker’s effective discount factor, which is given by:11
Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 {1 + λf [ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1 − 1]} (17)
When (13) is binding, the leverage ratio can be written as:
φt =
ηt
ι− νt (18)
For positive values of net worth, the constraint binds only if 0 < νt < ι. With νt > 0, it is
profitable to expand Wt. However, if νt > ι, the incentive constraint does not bind since the
value from intermediation exceeds the gain from diverting funds. In equilibrium, I assume
(and verify) that the incentive-compatibility constraint always binds within a neighbourhood
of the non-stochastic steady state. That is, the amount of funds banks can intermediate is
limited by their net worth due to the borrowing constraint.
Finally, aggregate net worth is the sum of the net worth of existing bankers plus the
start-up funds of entering ones. Surviving bankers carry their total net-worth into the next
period, whereas new bankers receive a fraction / (1− λf ) of the assets of exiting ones in
order to start business. Hence, in aggregate:
nt = λf
{[
(rx,t−1 − rh,t−1)− (rx,t−1 − rb,t−1 (1− δt))αWt−1
]
φt−1 + rh,t−1
}
nt−1
+ {qx,tax,i,t−1 + qb,tδtab,i,t−1} (19)
2.3 Production
2.3.1 Capital Producers
Perfectly competitive capital producers buy and repair undepreciated capital from wholesale
firms and invest in new capital by purchasing and transforming domestic final goods. The
repaired and newly created capital is then sold to wholesalers as an input to production. The
discounted real profit of capital producers, ΠCP, is given by:
Max
zt
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+sΛt,t+s {qx,t+s (kt+s − (1− σ) kt−1+s)− zt+s}
where qx,t is the value of one unit of new capital and zt denotes the amount of final goods
invested to generate new capital. Capital producers are assumed to incur adjustment costs
11The effective discount rate of bankers differs from that of the households due to the financial friction.
when investing in new capital. The law of motion of capital is thus given by:
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kt = ξ
z
t
[
1− Δ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2]
zt + (1− σ) kt−1 (20)
where Δ governs investment adjustment costs and ξzt represents investment-specific technol-
ogy shocks. Substituting (20) in the objective function of capital producers, the optimal level
of investment is given by:
1 = qx,tξ
z
t
(
1− Δ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2
−Δ
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)
zt
zt−1
)
+βΛt,t+1qx,t+1ξ
z
t+1Δ
(
zt+1
zt
− 1
)
z2t+1
z2t
(21)
2.3.2 Wholesale Firms
Perfectly competitive wholesale firms use the composite labour input and capital in order to
produce a homogeneous good. They purchase capital from capital producers at the real price
qx,t, and finance their capital acquisition by borrowing from the domestic intermediary. To be
specific, the intermediary issues claims ax,t equal to the number of units of capital acquired,
kt, pricing each claim at the price of a unit of capital. After production, wholesalers sell their
capital to capital producers and pay the return rx,t over their loans.
The production function of wholesale firms is given by:
xt = ξ
s
t (kt−1)
α (lt)
1−α−ν (gx,t)
ν (22)
where ξst is a shook to total factor productivity and α is the share of capital in production.
Wholesalers’ marginal productivity can also be enhanced through the provision of a produc-
tive public-good. As in Barro (1990), I retain the assumption of constant returns to scale in
all factors of production. Similarly to the utility-enhancing public good formulation, I allow
the flow of productive spending to increase private productivity, rather than the stock.12
The homogeneous good is sold to domestic retailers at the real price px,t. The demand
curve for composite labour services is given by:
wt = px,t (1− α− ν) xt
lt
(23)
Perfect competition imposes zero profits and therefore the ex-post real return paid to banks
is given by:
rx,t−1 =
px,tαxt/kt−1 + qx,t (1− σ)
qx,t−1
(24)
12This formulation is widely used in the literature for its increased tractability. See also Turnovsky (1999).
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2.3.3 Retail Firms
A continuum of retail firms purchase the homogeneous good produced by wholesalers at the
real price px,t and differentiate it into a continuum of retail goods that are sold to final good
firms at home and abroad. Retailer i faces the following demand curve:
yi,r,t =
(
Pi,r,t
Pr,t
)−μp (
yl,t + y

m,t
)
(25)
where μp > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between retail varieties, and yl,t
and ym,t denote aggregate demand for domestic retail goods by local final goods producers
and aggregate imports from the core, respectively. Retailer i sets the price of the retail
variety it produces, Pi,r,t, independently of where it is sold to since the law of one price is
assumed to hold. Finally, the price index of the composite retail good is given by Pr,t =(∫ 1
0
(Pi,r,t)
1−μp di
)1/(1−μp)
.
Retail firms are subject to Calvo price rigidities such that each period only a fraction
1− λp of retailers is able to adjust prices. When a retail firm does not re-optimize its price,
it updates it to lagged inflation. Retail prices follow:
Pi,r,t+s =
⎧⎨
⎩ P
∗
i,r,t+s
P ∗i,h,t (Π
s
k=1πr,t+k−1)
ϑp
with prob. 1− λp
with prob. λp
(26)
where indexation is governed by ϑp ∈ [0, 1], a measure of the extent to which prices adjust
to past inflation, and πr,t = Pr,t/Pr,t−1. When allowed to adjust prices, retailer i maximizes
the stream of real discounted profits, ΠR (i), given by:
Max
pi,h,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλp)
s Λt,t+s
{[
Pi,r,t
Pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,r,t
}
subject to (25) and (26). The numeraire Pt is the consumer price index.
2.3.4 Final Good Producers
Perfectly competitive firms produce a non-tradeable final good by aggregating a continuum
of domestic and foreign intermediate goods. The aggregation technology for the final good
is given by:
yt =
[
()
1
γ (yl,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−) 1γ (ym,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
(27)
In the above CES aggregator, the home-bias parameter  denotes the fraction of goods pro-
duced at home that is used in the production of the final good. The elasticity of substitution
between home-produced and imported intermediate goods is given by γ.
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(27). The resulting optimal demand functions are given by:
yh,t = 
(
Pr,t
Pt
)−γ
yt (28)
yf,t = (1−)
(
P r,t
Pt
)−γ
yt (29)
The consumer price index, Pt, is obtained by plugging in (28) and (29) into (27):
Pt =
[
 (Pr,t)
1−γ + (1−) (P r,t)1−γ] 11−γ (30)
2.4 Government
Similarly to Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Bocola (2015), the government issues
long-term securities which pay the coupon μb every quarter and the principal when bonds
reach maturity. Government bonds mature with probability λb, implying an average duration
of bonds of 1/λb periods. Government debt is held by domestic financial intermediaries.
13
Hence, in the aggregate, the number of claims held by the financial intermediary must equal
the total amount borrowed by the government, ab,t = dg,t. The government’s ex post budget
constraint is given by:
(λb + (1− λb)μb) dg,t−1 +Gt + Tt = τc,tct + qb,t (dg,t − (1− λb) dg,t−1) (31)
where qb,t is the price of loans to the government. Conversely, the return on government
bonds is given by:
rb,t−1 =
λb + (1− λb) (μb + qb,t)
qb,t−1
(32)
I model sovereign credit risk in a parsimonious way similar to Schabert and van Wijnber-
gen (2014) and Corsetti et al. (2013). In particular, I assume that the government’s decision
not to honour its debts depends on a fiscal limit above which the fiscal burden is deemed to
be politically unacceptable.14 Exogenous investors speculate about the actual value of the
fiscal limit, with the resulting expected probability of default being a determining factor for
the dynamics of sovereign bond prices and, consequently, of the net worth of banks. To be
specific, actual default is neutral ex post in the sense that it does not reduce actual govern-
Final good producers maximize profits Ptyt − Pr,tyl,t − P r,tym,t each period, subject to
13Banks do not price sovereign bonds and supply the government with the amount of funds it demands.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007) describe how to implement optimal portfolio choice (and pricing) in an
open economy setting, while Dedola et al. (2013) apply their method to a model of banks with cross-border
linkages. Kollmann et al. (2013) assume instead that banks bear portfolio adjustment costs on government
and private bond holdings in order to pin down bank’s portfolio composition.
14Refer to Davig and Leeper (2011).
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ment debt. However, ex ante, the probability of default is crucial for the pricing of sovereign
bonds and, through its effects on the net worth of banks, for the economy.15 The expectation
over the probability of default is given by:
δt = δ (st/s)
Θ exp
(
εdt
)
(33)
where εdt is an exogenous shock that captures the market’s perception regarding sovereign
credit risk and and st ≡ dg,t/gdpt is the fiscal stance. The parameter Θ denotes the elasticity
of the probability of default with respect to changes in the fiscal stance.
In the exercises below, I consider four fiscal instruments but assume that only one is
active at a time. Denoting by ψt the active fiscal instrument, the simple fiscal rule takes the
following form:
ψt = ψ (st/s¯)
κψ (34)
where κψ characterises the strength to which the government stabilizes the fiscal stance. In
other words, the lower the (absolute) value of κψ the more willing is the government to let
the fiscal stance deviate from its steady state ratio in response to shocks. Absent lump-
sum transfers, actual consolidation measures put forward during the sovereign debt crisis
involved raising distortionary taxation and cutting government spending. In this paper,
I focus on consumption and labour income taxation, and wasteful and productive public
expenditure. When active, each fiscal instrument is assumed to follow the simple rule (34),
with κτc , κτl > 0 and κT , κge , κgx < 0, such that an increase of the fiscal stance st leads to
an increase in taxation or to cuts in expenditure. Finally, the reason behind the focus on
simple rules of the form (34), where only the fiscal stance is targetted, is meant to ensure the
comparability across the different instruments.
2.5 Closing the model
2.5.1 Market Clearing
Two markets for goods in each region must clear in equilibrium. The supply of intermediate
goods by wholesalers must equal aggregate demand by retailer firms:
xt = Υr,t
(
yl,t + y

m,t
)
(35)
15The strategic default literature is growing rapidly after the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
Gennaioli et al. (2014), Bocola (2015) and Sosa-Padilla (2014) expand this literature by including a banking
sector. Because default can actually occur in these models, they are suited to characterize strategic default
and its distributional consequences to economic agents.
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Note that, due to price dispersion, retailers incur real losses during price setting, which are
denoted by Υr,t.
16 On the other hand, the non-tradeable domestic final good is sold to
households, to capital producers, and to the government:
yt = ct + zt +Gt + Ψ (etbf,t) (36)
Labour market clearing implies:
lh,t = Υw,tlt (37)
where lh,t =
∫ 1
0
li,tdi and Υw,t denotes the dead-weight loss due to wage dispersion.
Holdings of internationally traded financial assets must also clear, bf,t + b

f,t = 0. Real
GDP is defined as:
gdpt = yt + nxt (38)
with net exports being given by:
nxt = pr,ty

m,t − etpr,tym,t (39)
where ym,t are exports of locally-produced retail goods, sold at the real price pr,t, and ym,t
are imports of the foreign-produced goods, bought at the real price pr,t, which is expressed
in consumption units of the core and, therefore, is converted to domestic consumption units
using the real exchange rate et = P

t /Pt.
2.5.2 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is conducted through a simple targeting rule by which the nominal interest
rate responds to aggregate inflation and aggregate GDP growth in the monetary union:
it =
(
i
)1−ρi (it−1)ρi ((πmu,t)ρπ ( ˜gdpmu,t)ρy)(1−ρi) (40)
where ρi ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing parameter, and ρπ and ρg are the usual response coefficients.
Aggregate variables are denoted with an a superscript and are the sum of the respective
regional variables weighted by their population size. Headline inflation in the periphery is
defined as πt = Pt/Pt−1, whereas GDP growth is given by ˜gdpt = gdpt/gdpt−1. Finally, the
Fisher condition holds in each region: rt = it/πt+1.
16Expression (35), and the definition of Υh,t, are obtained from the aggregation of retail production xt =∫ 1
0
yi,r,tdi.
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2.6 Calibration
One period in the model corresponds to one quarter. The model is solved numerically around
a deterministic, zero-inflation steady state. Table 1 reports the calibrated values used in the
analysis below. Except when specifically stated, corresponding parameter in both regions
share the same values.
I set the discount factor, β, to 0.99, implying a steady state annual interest rate of 4%.
The immediate utility function with respect to consumption takes the standard logarithmic
form, implying a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ = 1), whereas a quadratic
disutility from labour is assumed by setting η to 1. External habits in consumption are set
to 0.70. I calibrate the home bias to 0.70, which implies a steady state trade share over GDP
of 30% and is in line with the data for the Euro area countries. The price elasticity between
home produced and imported goods is set to 1.2. To preserve symmetry between the two
regions, I impose zero net foreign assets in steady state.
The capital share in production takes the standard value of 0.30, while productive public
spending accounts for 0.05 of total production. I assume a value of 2.5% for the steady
state quarterly depreciation rate of capital. The parameter governing the costs of adjusting
investment is set to 4, also in accordance with the literature. For the parameters pertaining
to the banking sector, I use the same values as Gertler and Karadi (2011). To be specific,
I set the steady state leverage ratio of banks, φ, to 4 and the probability a banker remains
active through the next period, λf , to 0.972. The premium between the interest rate on loans
to private firms and the risk-free rate is set to 1% in annualized terms. The implied values
for ι, the share of divertable assets, and , the fraction of startup assets new bankers receive,
are 0.34 and 0.003, respectively.
Also based on the standard calibration in the DSGE literature, I set the elasticity of
substitution across types of labour and intermediate goods such that wage and price markups
are equal to 14 and 10%, respectively. I calibrate the Calvo parameters such that, on average,
the average duration of nominal wage and price contracts last 4 quarters, while ϑp, the price
indexation parameter, is set to 0.10 following Lamma and Rabanal (2014). The parameters
of the monetary rule are well within the standard values found in the literature. In particular,
I set the weight on lagged nominal interest rates to 0.80, the response to inflation, ρπ, to
1.75, and the weight on output targering, ρy, to 0.25.
Table 1: Parameter values
Utility
β 0.99 discount rate
σ 1 coefficient of risk aversion
 0.70 habits in consumption
η 1 inverse elasticity labour supply
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Table 1: Parameter values (continued)
Trade
γ 1.20 price elasticity of traded goods
ω 0.70 home bias
bf 0 net foreign assets
υ 0.01 adjustment costs international bonds
Production
α 0.30 capital share
ν 0.05 share of productive public good
δ 0.025 capital depreciation rate
Δ 4 investment adjustment costs
Banks
rx − r 0.0025 premium on private lending
φ 4 leverage ratio
λf 0.972 survival probability
Nominal rigidities
w 8 substitution elasticity of labour
λw 0.75 Calvo lottery wages
p 11 substitution elasticity of goods
λp 0.75 Calvo lottery prices
ϑp 0.10 inflation indexation
Monetary policy
ρi 0.80 innertia
ρπ 1.75 response to inflation
ρy 0.25 response to output
Government
λb 0.025 inverse average debt maturity
χ 0.002 sovereign spread
Θ 0 sovereign spread response to fiscal stance
dg 0.60 annual public debt over GDP
τc 0.20 consumption tax rate
τl 0.25 labour income tax rate
ge 0.12 wasteul expenditure over GDP
gx 0.08 productive expeniture over GDP
κL -3.75 lump sum response to fiscal stance
κge -1.75 wasteful spending response to fiscal stance
κgx -2.15 productive spending response to fiscal stance
κτc 0.95 consumption tax response to fiscal stance
κτl 1.175 labour income tax response to fiscal stance
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I calibrate λb such that the average maturity of government debt equals 10 years, as 10
year bond yields are the indicative statistic used to assess government’s borrowing costs.
Also for illustrative purposes, I consider a steady state annual spread on sovereign debt of
80 basis points. For the benchmark calibration, I assume that sovereign spreads are purely
exogenous and do not depend on the fiscal stance. I therefore set Θ to 0. The ratio of public
debt to annual GDP is set equal to the upper limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty of
60%. The effective tax rates on consumption and labour income are based on calculations for
the periphery of the Euro area using annual data from the Eurostat. Wasteful government
expenditure, ge,t, accounts for 12% of GDP, whereas productive spending, gx,t, represents
8%. These values are such that total government spending amounts to 20% of GDP in the
steady state. I calibrate the parameters in the fiscal rule, κψ, for each of the five fiscal
instruments by imposing that, for a sovereign risk shock that adds 10 percentage points to
the sovereign interest rate, the increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is capped at 2%.
This cap is purely illustrative and is only meant to standardize, and make comparable, the
general equilibrium effects of using different fiscal instruments to stabilize the fiscal stance.
Below I run sensitivity analysis to changes in the values of κψ.
3 Sovereign Spreads: the transmission mechanism
In this section I inspect the transmission of sovereign spread shocks in the model. I start
with the case when the government uses lump sum transfers to stabilize the fiscal stance. I
do so in order to abstract from the distortions caused by the other fiscal instruments. I then
assess the impact different fiscal distortions have on the transmission of these shocks.
3.1 Lump sum transfers
Figure 1 reports the impulse responses to a shock that adds 10 percentage points to the
sovereign spread in the periphery, in annual terms. The solid blue line shows the base-
line specification, where government debt-to-GDP ratio equals 60% in the steady state and
sovereign spreads do not respond to the fiscal stance, Θ = 0. The increase in the probability
that the government will not service its debt lowers the value of government bonds and,
conversely, raises the premium investors require to hold these assets. As interest payments
become heavier, the government incurs a budget deficit, which raises the stock of public debt.
As the price of government bonds plunges, banks, who hold these securities in their
portfolios, see their total net worth contract. This triggers a persistent increase in banks’
leverage ratio. Due to leverage constraints, banks are forced to reduce lending and to raise
the premium on lending rates to private firms in order to rebuild the value of their equity. In
the baseline scenario, the pass-through of sovereign spreads to firm’s borrowing costs is more
than 1/5, with the increase in 10 percentage points in the former leading to an increase of
more than 2 percentage points in the latter. The drop in credit supplied by banks and the
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1807
Figure 1: Absent fiscal distortions
Responses to a sovereign spread increase of 10 percentage points. Spreads and inflation responses
are in annualised basis points; net-exports are in levels; remaining responses are expressed in terms
of percent deviations from steady state. Θ governs the feedback effect from the fiscal stance to
sovereign spreads.
increase in borrowing costs induce a collapse in investment of more than 10% at the trough.
As firms face higher costs of capital, labour demand also contracts and total employment
falls. Consequently, real output falls.
The marked contraction in domestic demand due to the fall in investment induces prices
to fall. Moreover, the fall in inflation and in output leads the central bank to cut nominal
interest rates. Although the real interest rate initially increases, it subsequently falls below
its steady state. Because households are net savers domestically, they make their intertem-
poral consumption decisions in response to the risk-free rate. Hence, and despite the fall
in employment, the fall in prices and in the real interest rate leads households to increase
consumption.
Figure 1 shows three alternative scenarios to the baseline. The dashed dark-grey lines
report the responses to the same shock when sovereign spreads respond to the evolution of
the fiscal stance, i.e. for Θ = 0.03.17 Compared to the baseline, the responses under this
scenario do not change significantly. However, this is not the case for higher ratios of public
debt to GDP. The solid light-grey lines show instead the case when spreads do not respond
to the fiscal stance, but the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio equals 90%. A higher public
debt-to-GDP ratio intensifies the magnitude of the recession. This is because banks now
hold a larger share of government bonds relative to total assets in their balance sheets. As a
17Refer to Corsetti et al. 2013 for a discussion on the quantification of the impact of the fiscal stance on
sovereign spreads and, consequently, on credit spreads to private firms.
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Figure 2: With fiscal distortions
Responses to a sovereign spread increase of 10 percentage points. Spreads and inflation responses
are in annualised basis points; net-exports are in levels; remaining responses are expressed in terms
of percent deviations from steady state. LS: lump sum transfers; ge: wasteful expenditures; gx:
productive expenditure; τc: consumption taxation; τl: labour income taxation.
result, a fall in the price of sovereign bonds produces a relatively higher loss in their portfolio.
Accordingly, the pass-through to private lending rates increases significantly by more. The
resulting collapse in investment and the drop in labour are sizeable too.
The final scenario in Figure 1, the dashed light-grey lines, reports the worst case scenario.
Besides assuming a public debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 90%, sovereign spreads also respond
to the fiscal stance, Θ = 0.03. Unlike in the previous case when the public debt represents
60% of GDP, having sovereign spreads responding to the fiscal stance under the worst case
scenario generates a significantly bigger recession. Hence, a high public debt-to-GDP ratio is
not only a potential source of economic instability per se, it can also generate sizeable feed-
back effects when sovereign spreads respond to the weakening of the fiscal stance. Moreover,
this exercise assumes that the response of sovereign spreads to the fiscal stance is constant.
However, it is possible that the elasticity of spreads is increasing with the debt-to-GDP ratio.
If that is the case, the size of the feed-back effects reported in Figure 1 would appear rather
conservative.
3.2 Distortionary fiscal policy
Figure 2 shows the responses to a sovereign spread shock when the government uses dis-
tortionary fiscal instruments. The values of the parameters governing fiscal policy, κψ, are
calibrated such that the increase in the fiscal stance is capped at 2% under each of the four
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distortionary instruments as well as under lump sum transfers. By doing so, the consolidation
effort is normalized and the feed-back effects of fiscal policy to the economy are compara-
ble. For comparison purposes, the solid red lines in Figure 2 report the scenario where the
government uses lump sum transfers to stabilize the fiscal stance.
The solid blue lines depict the case when fiscal stance stabilization is achieved through
adjustments to wasteful public expenditure, ge,t. To curb the increase in the fiscal stance,
public spending has to be reduced. This leads GDP to fall by more than in the baseline.
Nevertheless, because the reduction in wasteful spending crowds in private consumption, the
fall in GDP is mitigated. The fall in aggregate demand lead firms to further reduce the
demand for labour, while the fall in investment is not affected significantly.
The same can be seen from the dashed-blue lines, which report the scenario when the
government cuts productive public spending to stabilize the fiscal stance. To cap the rise
of the fiscal stance at 2%, the government has to reduce public expenditure by more than
3%, and significantly by more than if it were to cut wasteful spending. The direct reason is
that cutting productive spending further subtracts nearly 0.70% more to GDP at the trough
relative to the previous scenario, requiring an extra effort to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Although the behaviour of investment is similar, labour falls by more, but only marginally:
as productive public spending falls, the marginal productivity of labour falls as well, and
labour demand is reduced. The larger fall in GDP is explained by both the larger cut in
public spending, but also by the lower crowding in of private consumption. This is due to the
behaviour of employment and the real wage, which are adversely affected by the reduction
in the marginal productivity of labour.
The solid black lines in Figure 2 correspond to the case when the government uses con-
sumption taxation to keep the fiscal stance to target. In this scenario, the government is led to
collect more revenues in order to reduce the public debt. The increase in consumption taxes
generates a contraction in consumption, with households substituting consumption today for
consumption in the future, when taxes are cut back. With the contraction in consumption
adding to the contraction in investment, GDP falls further than in the baseline, pushing up
on the public debt-to-GDP ratio. When the government instead uses labour income taxation,
as reported by the dashed-black lines, public revenues need to be raised by more. This again
is explained by the behavior of GDP, which falls by more than in the case when consumption
taxes where increased. Labour income taxes reduce the incentive to work, lowering labour
supply. In equilibrium, employment falls significantly by more than in all previous scenarios.
Hoseholds retrench spending compared to the previous secnarios, and investment falls by
more. These effects combined explain the larger fall in GDP.
As reported in Figure 2, distortionary fiscal policy aggravates the recession caused by
sovereign spread shocks. If the budgetary strain on the government is alleviated and, there-
fore, if the consolidation effort that is required is reduced, the distortionary effects of domestic
fiscal policy can also be mitigated. The next subsection proposes a transfer schemes that
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can achieve an alleviation of the government budget during sovereign spread shocks. Again
to facilitate the discussion, I first assume that the active domestic fiscal instrument consists
of lump sum transfers. Subsequently, I reintroduce distortionary fiscal policy in the analysis
and compare the effects of implementing the transfer scheme across the different domestic
fiscal instruments.
4 Fiscal Transfers
Governments in countries that were more severely hit during the sovereign debt crisis eventu-
ally requested external financial assistance in order to mitigate the budgetary strain caused
by widening sovereign spreads. The various assistance programmes implemented in coun-
tries like Ireland, Greece and Portugal entailed credit lines to the government under more
favourable financial conditions than those offered by the market at that time. In return, cred-
itors were granted the power to monitor the duly implementation of consolidation measures
and structural reforms aimed at guaranteeing the sustainability of interventioned countries’
public finances.
In this paper, I consider a simple fiscal transfers scheme between national governments.
The scheme has governments making transfers across the border when sovereign spreads
widen abroad. Transfers are determined by the following rule:
St =
(
δt − δ
)κs
(41)
where δt is the sovereign credit risk premium defined above. An equivalent expression defines
the transfers to be made the opposite direction. St, together its foreign counterpart S

t ,
denote aggregate transfers made between governments. For instance, when sovereign spreads
arise in the core, the government in periphery is called upon to transfer a given amount of
funds, determined by κs, to the government in the core. By definition, transfers are only
temporary, being equal to zero in the long-run. Importantly, the parameter governing the
magnitude of the transfers, κs, is equal for both countries. The proposed scheme addresses
directly the problem of fiscal strain due to sovereign spreads. As there is no direct transfers
to households or firms, the feedback to the real economy will run through the government
budget.18
I conduct the analysis in the remainder of the paper using two alternative measures of
welfare, both widely used in the literature. First, I use the utility-based criterion (1). In
particular, I express the welfare gains in terms of certainty-equivalent consumption: the
18I assume δt is observable and, therefore, can be used to guide policy. In reality, however, sovereign spread
shocks might be difficult to measure. Importantly, it might also be the case that optimal transfers should
not respond to all swings in sovereign spreads as measured, for instance, by the differentials in government
bond yields in the secondary market. I leave these questions for future research.
permanent change in consumption that would make households equally well off as under
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the non-stochastic steady state. Denote by λce,s the welfare gain associated with a federal
transfer scheme defined by κs. Then λce,s must solve:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
(1 + λce) c, lh
)
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (cκt , l
κ
t ) (42)
where c and lh are the deterministic steady state values of consumption and labour, and
{cκs,t, lh,κs,t}∞t=0 are the consumption and labour allocations corresponding to the fiscal trasfer
scheme defined by κs ∈ R+0 . I follow Evers (2012, 2015) and further decompose the welfare
compensation into its mean and variance components, λm and λv, respectively, which reflect
the changes in the mean and varaince of consumption and labour and satisfy (1 + λce) =
(1 + λm) (1 + λv).
Second, I consider an ad hoc loss function in which the relevant satistics are the squared
gaps of inflation and output growth:
Lad hoct = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
λπ (πmu,t − π)2 + (1− λπ)
(
˜gdpmu,t − 1
)2}
(43)
The objective of the policy maker is to minimize this loss function by reducing the volatility
of inflation and output. I follow Blanchard et al. (2017) and set λπ = 3/4.
19
The calibrated volatility of sovreign spread shocks determines the quantitative magni-
tudes of both welfare gains and volatilities. However, as the qualitative results rest on the
comparison between different schemes, the policy message should be robust to a different
calibration. I what follows, I set the standard deviation of sovereign spreads to 0.001, with
an autoregression coefficient set to 0.90.20
4.1 Lump sum transfers
The first column of Table 2 reports the impact of sovereign spread shocks on welfare and the
volatility of inflation, output, consumption, labour, and investment. Because the calibration
of the model is perfectly symmetric, the values reported in the Table refer to both countries
alike. The second row in Table 2 reports the welfare gain compared to the deterministic
steady state as measured by the utility criterion. A negative value of −0.60 implies a
loss in consumption equivalent terms derived from sovereign spread shocks. Although these
shocks affect negatively on the mean and volatility of welfare, it is the volatility component
that has the largest negative impact. Turning to the volatilities, sovereign spread shocks
19The welfare analysis is done on a second-order log-linear approximation to the model’s equilibrium
conditions. Details can be found in the appendix.
20The volatility of spreads on 10 year government bond yields in the Euro area, over the 10 year German
bund, vary wildely across country. Using quarterly data from 1990 to 2016, the figures run from 0.0004 and
0.0009 for the Netherlands and France, and 0.0178 and 0.0068 for Greece and Portugal, respectively.
have the greatest impact on investment, as could already be seen in Figures 1. The volatility
of consumption and output is of similar magnitude, while inflation is only mildly affected.
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The second and third column of Table 2 report the gains from implementing the fiscal
transfer scheme in a scenario where national governments use lump sum transfers to fund
the scheme and to stabilize the respective fiscal stances. The value of κs that maximizes
welfare is found to be 1.10. Under a fiscal transfer scheme, the welfare loss generated by
sovereign spread shocks is reduced to −0.36 , a fall of nearly 40%. The main contribution
for this fall comes from the steady state component of welfare, which reverses sign and now
becomes positive, with both the stochastic mean of consumption increasing and the mean of
labour falling. The volatility component is reduced by 16.33%. Looking at the volatilities,
the largest reduction is found to be with respect to investment, while percentage changes in
consumption and labour volatilities are of similar magnitude.
Turning to the ad hoc measure, the value of κs that minimizes the loss function (43) equals
1.82. Larger transfers between governments result in a welfare improvement as measured by
the utility criterion of 25%, with a smaller improvement coming from the stochastic means
component and a larger fall from the volatility component. In fact, minimizing (43) yields
larger reductions in volatility for all variables shown in Table 2. Although the reduction in
the volatility of inflation is almost negligible, the forth and fifth columns show that changing
the weight λπ in the loss function would not affect significantly the optimal value of κs under
the ad hoc function.
The last two columns of Table 2 show the welfare gains and volatility reductions of
fiscal transfers schemes that target the reduction in the volatility of consumption and labour,
Table 2: Welfare and Stability: absent fiscal distortions
No Maximizing Stabilizing
Transfers Welfare Ad Hoc π gdp c l
κs 0,00 1,10 1,82 1,83 1,82 2,14 1,92
λce -0,60 -0,36 -0,45 -0,45 -0,45 -0,55 -0,48
Δλce - -39,42 -24,69 -24,28 -24,69 -8,55 -20,28
λm -0,07 0,08 -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,12 -0,05
Δλm - -217,80 -62,09 -58,36 -62,09 78,41 -22,84
λv -0,53 -0,44 -0,43 -0,43 -0,43 -0,43 -0,43
Δλv - -16,33 -19,85 -19,87 -19,85 -19,81 -19,95
Δσπ * -1,44 -1,73 -1,73 -1,73 -1,68 -1,73
Δσgdp 0,03 -9,06 -10,63 -10,63 -10,63 -10,30 -10,60
Δσc 0,04 -15,75 -19,42 -19,44 -19,42 -19,78 -19,61
Δσl 0,02 -16,24 -19,59 -19,60 -19,59 -19,39 -19,64
Δσz 2,19 -32,45 -37,54 -37,51 -37,54 -35,41 -37,18
* 4.1025e-04. λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes relative
to the scenario without transfers.
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Figure 3: Fiscal Transfers absent domestic fiscal distortions
Responses to a sovereign spread increase of 10 percentage points. Spreads and inflation responses
are in annualised basis points; net-exports are in levels; remaining responses are expressed in terms
of percent deviations from steady state. Θ governs the feedback effect from the fiscal stance to
sovereign spreads. κ∗T = 1.104.
respectively. Interestingly, the scheme aiming at reducing the volatility of consumption yields
the lowest improvements in welfare as measure by the utility criterion. In fact, the stochastic
mean component of the consumption equivalent gain falls by more than 78% compared to the
scenario with no transfers. Instead, the value of κs that minimizes the volatility of labour
yields results closer to those obtained when the objective is to minimize the ad hoc loss
function.21
Figure (3) shows the responses of the periphery to a sovereign spread shock under the
fiscal transfer scheme calibrated to maximize welfare as measured by the utility criterion, i.e.
with κs = 1.10. For comparison, I plot the responses to the same shock in the absence of fiscal
transfers. Domestic fiscal policy is conducted using lump sum transfers and the parameter
governing the domestic fiscal rule is kept constant under the two scenarios. This exercise is
illustrative of the effects of fiscal transfers on the banking system, since it abstracts from the
distortionary effects of fiscal policy. An increase in spreads leads the foreign government to
make a transfer to the government in the periphery of a magnitude large enough to bring the
public debt-to-GDP ratio more than 6% below its steady state value. The fall in public debt
reduces the amount of assets financial intermediaries hold in their portfolios. This causes
banks to further increase the pass-through of sovereign spreads to the interest rate on private
lending. However, after an initial jump in the interest rate on private lending, banks quickly
21Companion tables in the appendix report sensitivity analysis over different values of the parameters
governing domestic fiscal policy, under symmetric and asymmetric calibrations.
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reduce it, bringing it below the path under the scenario with no fiscal transfers. On the other
hand, as banks reduce their exposure to government debt, their leverage ratios fall more
quickly and they become relatively better positioned to supply credit to private firms. As a
result, the drop in investment is mitigated substantially. With less scarce access to credit,
firms reduce their capital purchases and labour demand by less, mitigating the fall in output.
4.2 Distortionary fiscal policy
The analysis so far has assumed that regional governments conduct domestic fiscal policy
using lump sum taxation. It has shown that fiscal transfers can be welfare improving in
a number of different scenarios under this crucial assumption. In reality, however, govern-
ments typically use distortionary taxation and spending as fiscal instruments. Unlike lump
sum taxation, these instruments can significantly affect intertemporal substitution as well
as resource allocation. Importantly, as the analysis that follows shows, distortionary fiscal
policy changes the incentives to the implementation of fiscal transfers as well.
In an environment with distortionary fiscal policy, it turns out that no positive value of
κs is associated with an improvement in welfare in the monetary union. As shown below,
fiscal transfers between member states, by acting directly on the fiscal stance, reduce the
consolidation effort required by the recipient government. However, transfers also affect the
fiscal stance of the country they originate from, requiring fiscal policy to adjust there as well.
On balance, it appears that these effects overturn the welfare gains from the transfer schemes
discussed above.
The impact fiscal transfers have on welfare comprises a non-trivial combination of effects
on the volatilities and stochastic means of consumption and labour. In other words, transfers
can prove to lower the volatility of some variables despite affecting negatively on welfare. This
is illustrated in Table 3. The first four columns shows the impact on welfare and volatility of
implementing a fiscal transfer scheme characterized by a value of κs equal to 1.10, the value
that maximizes the utility criterion when domestic fiscal policy is non-distortionary. Again,
all outcomes reported in the table are comparing against a scenario without transfers. For
all instruments except productive public spending, gx,t, the increase in the volatility compo-
nent of the consumption equivalent measure nearly doubles, accentuating the welfare losses
generated by sovereign spread shocks. The same is true for the stochastic mean component.
For the case of productive public spending, this term is behind the increase in welfare costs.
Adjusting productive spending in response to shocks not only reduces the stochastic mean
of private consumption, but it increases the stochastic mean of labour. In other words, it
affects the mean allocation of resources in an inefficient fashion as measured by the welfare
criterion.
Turning to the volatilities, fiscal transfers increase significantly the volatility of consump-
tion when the government uses wasteful spending and consumption taxation to stabilize the
fiscal stance. These two instruments, together with labour income taxation, also push up
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Table 3: Welfare and Stability: with fiscal distortions
Welfare Ad Hoc
ge gx τc τl ge gx τc τl
κs 1,10 1,10 1,10 1,10 0,83 0,42 0,79 0,45
λce -13,26 -9,98 -8,82 -13,90 -11,90 -7,48 -7,29 -11,82
Δλce 58,40 53,21 84,26 33,37 42,16 14,81 52,21 13,40
λm -11,69 -9,07 -7,43 -11,27 -10,79 -6,72 -6,30 -10,28
Δλm 53,53 61,57 82,10 26,55 41,68 19,65 54,23 15,42
λv -1,59 -0,92 -1,40 -2,66 -1,13 -0,77 -1,00 -1,55
Δλv 108,25 1,40 97,41 73,87 47,39 -15,30 40,82 1,71
Δσπ -0,65 15,50 -0,47 11,59 -1,00 -0,96 -1,02 -2,23
Δσgdp -13,44 -3,27 -12,46 -6,59 -14,39 -11,35 -13,63 -10,91
Δσc 300,38 17,64 180,63 42,68 158,42 -12,77 107,66 15,72
Δσl 79,07 -0,37 82,05 78,45 30,81 -15,27 28,55 -0,50
Δσz -1,79 3,86 -13,24 -28,80 -3,31 -1,19 -12,47 -18,99
on labour volatility. These insights were already apparent from the analysis of the impact
of fiscal transfers on welfare. When the domestic fiscal instrument at hand is productive
government spending, the increase in volatilities is predominant for consumption and infla-
tion. However, this increase is relatively small when compared to the remaining distortionary
instruments.
The last four columns in Table 3 report the scenarios where κs is chosen to minimize
the ad hoc loss function. As reported, there are positive, albeit small, values of κs that
sustain a reduction in the volatility of inflation and GDP. In particular, when domestic fiscal
policy uses productive government spending, all volatilities are reduced. Despite this fact,
the welfare costs still increase due to the negative impact on the stochastic mean component.
For the remaining three instruments, consumption volatility is never reduced, with wasteful
spending and consumption taxation also increasing the volatility of labour.
The usefulness of starting the analysis assuming that domestic fiscal policy is carried
out with lump sum taxation is now evident. Under such scenario, fiscal transfers have the
ability to reduce the fiscal adjustment caused by sovereign spread shocks, with both regions
sharing the fiscal burden. Insofar as stabilising the fiscal stance does not involve distorting the
allocation of resources in production nor the intertemporal allocation of consumption, welfare
and economic stability were shown to improve. However, the inefficiencies induced when
fiscal policy is distortionary wipe out the welfare benefits of fiscal transfers. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that fiscal transfers do have an important effect in reducing macroeconomic
fluctuations.
ge: wasteful expenditures; gx: productive expenditure; τc: consumption taxation; τl: labour
income taxation. λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes
relative to the scenario without transfers.
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Figure 4: Fiscal Transfers with domestic expenditure policy
Figure 5: Fiscal Transfers with domestic taxation policy
Responses to a sovereign spread increase of 10 percentage points. Spreads and inflation responses
are in annualised basis points; net-exports are in levels; remaining responses are expressed in terms
of percent deviations from steady state. ge: wasteful expenditures; gx: productive expenditure; τc:
consumption taxation; τl: labour income taxation. κ
∗
T = 1.104.
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periphery when domestic fiscal policy is distortionary. Figure 4 reports the cases when
national governments use expenditure instruments, whereas Figure 5 focuses on consumption
and labour income taxation. The solid lines in both figures report again the responses of
the periphery to a sovereign spread shock in the absence of fiscal transfers. The dashed lines
instead report a scenario where fiscal transfers are implemented for a value of κs equal to
1.10. As before, the parameters governing domestic fiscal policy, κψ, are kept constant across
the two scenarios and were calibrated such that, absent fiscal transfers, the increase in the
public debt-to-GDP ratio is curbed at 2%.
Turning first to Figure 4, the inflow of transfers from abroad leaves the domestic govern-
ment with enough space to increase spending. Under both expenditure instruments, fiscal
transfers reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio in the periphery, therefore reducing bank’s exposure
to government bonds. As with the case with lump sum transfers analysed above, initially
banks increase the interest rates on private lending by more. However, their subsequent path
back to steady state does not occur significantly faster compared to the scenario without
fiscal transfers, as it did in Figure (3). As a result, the fall in investment is not mitigated
significantly. Despite this fact, the increase in aggregate demand generated by the increase
public expenditure leads firms to cut demand for labour by less. Interestingly, because the
increase in wasteful expenditure is higher, demand for labour falls by less than when the gov-
ernment increases productive spending. This is so despite the fact that productive spending
increases the marginal productivity of labour. Output therefore falls by less while private
consumption is crowded out by government spending significantly.
Looking at Figure 5, the effects on consumption run exactly the opposite way. The
reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio caused by fiscal transfers allows the government
in the periphery to cut taxes. Hence, the effects on GDP, although comparable to the previous
cases, are caused instead by the increase in private consumption and, to a lesser extent, in
investment. Regarding the latter, the explanation rests on the same mechanism described for
the case of lump sum transfers in Figure (3): the fall in the pass-through occurs at a faster
pace, allowing firms to reduce capital purchases by less. The reduction in taxation explains
the increase in private consumption. Note that cuts in consumption taxation expand private
consumption by more, while cuts in labour income taxes affect labour by relatively more. In
fact, the increase in aggregate demand makes firms reduce labour demand by less, a plan
that is helped when labour income taxes are cut.
Cross-checking the insights from Figures 4 and 5 with Table 3 highlights important mes-
sages. The impulse responses of consumption when the government uses wasteful spending or
consumption taxation to stabilize the fiscal stance shows that fiscal transfers seem incapable
of reducing the volatility of consumption in the periphery. In the core, using these same
instruments (in the opposite direction as the foreign government need to cut spending/raise
revenue to fund the transfer to the periphery) also increases the volatility of consumption
there. This is reported in the Table. Turning to productive government spending, although
This can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, which show the impact of fiscal transfers in the
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consumption in the periphery appears less volatile, in the core it necessarily falls by more
compared to the scenario without transfers, therefore raising consumption volatility as well.
Finally, using labour income taxation to stabilize the fiscal stance under a fiscal transfer
scheme increases the response of consumption in the periphery while reducing the movements
in labour. In the core, a higher tax on labour income reduces employment and consumption
there. On net, as reported in the Table, both volatilities increase, rather than decrease, with
fiscal transfers.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the potentially positive effects fiscal transfers between countries
in the monetary union have in lessening the impact sovereign spread shocks have on economic
aggregates. However, they also show the impact fiscal policy has in distorting the allocation of
consumption and labour. Despite the fact that fiscal transfers can reduce economic volatility,
this analysis has shown that welfare can actually fall when fiscal transfers are implemented.
All in all, in the absence of lump sum taxation, it appears that, to reduce volatility and
improve welfare, a scheme of fiscal transfers needs not only to buffer effectively the economy
from sovereign spread shocks, but also to minimize the distortions its funding causes.
5 Further discussion
In the previous section, I found that sharing the burden of fiscal tightening imposed on one
country across all members of the monetary union is not welfare improving. However, one
could argue this result is dependent on the way domestic fiscal policy is carried or on the
complex effects domestic fiscal policy has on the banking sector. I therefore run the following
experiment, shown in Table 4. I assume that domestic fiscal policy is conducted such that
public debt (and not the public debt-to-GDP ratio) remains constant at all times.22 This
requires the domestic fiscal instrument to act decisively to curb any fall in tax revenues, which
depend on the evolution of the economy (public spending, including lump sum transfers,
depend solely on government policy), or any movement in the sovereign interest rate, in
order to keep the public debt constant. On the other hand, keeping government debt constant
insulates the banking sector from any effects steaming from the quantity of government debt
they hold in their portfolios. As a result, sovereign spread shocks, with or without fiscal
transfers, affect the banking sector solely through their impact on asset prices.
Under this setup, Table 4 shows that there are small positive values for κs that can
sustain the implementation of a fiscal transfer scheme that improves welfare as measured by
the utility criterion. However, the benefits a patently small. My conjecture is that, even for
a scenario where domestic fiscal policy is relatively harsh and where it does not mitigate the
impacts of sovereign spreads on the banking sector, the fact that in this paper the conduct
of fiscal policy is symmetric across the two regions at all time, fails to allow fiscal transfers
22In the appendix I show that reducing or increasing κψ, i.e. having domestic fiscal policy stabilizing less
or more quickly the fiscal stance, does not affect the qualitative results discussed in the previous section.
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Table 4: Holding government debt fixed
Welfare Ad Hoc
ge gx τc τl ge gx τc τl
κs 0,07 0,09 0,07 0,32 0,33 0,35 0,89 0,51
λce -8,36 -6,50 -4,67 -10,03 -8,67 -6,96 -6,82 -10,09
Δλce -0,26 -1,30 -0,40 -3,16 3,49 5,69 45,62 -2,62
λm -7,59 -5,71 -3,99 -8,87 -7,97 -6,23 -5,33 -8,71
Δλm 0,72 -0,25 0,56 -1,51 5,79 8,77 34,40 -3,24
λv -0,78 -0,79 -0,68 -1,18 -0,71 -0,73 -1,50 -1,39
Δλv -8,92 -8,29 -5,67 -14,15 -16,87 -14,92 108,03 1,45
Δσπ -0,17 -1,49 -0,16 -0,56 -0,55 1,86 -0,71 3,45
Δσgdp -1,75 -4,79 -2,05 -10,31 -4,70 -9,39 -12,64 -11,21
Δσc -13,83 -9,10 11,47 11,90 -11,66 -13,91 430,15 20,16
Δσl -8,08 -8,03 -8,56 -18,71 -17,11 -14,68 40,41 -1,95
Δσz 5,76 3,19 4,26 -9,81 29,83 11,89 65,12 -13,28
Table 5: Share government debt held domestically
Welfare Ad Hoc
sb = sb = sb = sb = sb = sb =
baseline 0.90 0.75 0.55 baseline 0.90 0.75 0.55
κs 1,10 1,05 0,91 0,46 1,82 1,90 1,92 1,94
λce -0,36 -0,53 -0,58 -0,60 -0,45 -0,56 -0,60 -0,62
Δλce -39,42 -15,94 -6,36 -0,84 -24,69 -11,47 -3,23 1,78
λm 0,08 -0,08 -0,14 -0,17 -0,03 -0,12 -0,16 -0,19
Δλm -217,80 -26,71 -8,47 -2,51 -62,09 9,84 8,50 6,88
λv -0,44 -0,46 -0,44 -0,43 -0,43 -0,45 -0,44 -0,43
Δλv -16,33 -13,82 -5,69 -0,16 -19,85 -15,68 -6,91 -0,30
Δσπ -1,44 -1,13 -0,43 -0,01 -1,73 -1,26 -0,52 -0,02
Δσgdp -9,06 -8,04 -3,14 -0,09 -10,63 -9,00 -3,75 -0,16
Δσc -15,75 -12,69 -5,07 -0,14 -19,42 -14,51 -6,19 -0,26
Δσl -16,24 -13,88 -5,75 -0,17 -19,59 -15,68 -6,94 -0,30
Δσz -32,45 -29,30 -14,21 -0,48 -37,54 -31,95 -16,50 -0,85
sb: share of government debt held by domestic banks. λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ
are stated in percentage changes relative to the scenario without transfers.
ge: wasteful expenditures; gx: productive expenditure; τc: consumption taxation; τl: labour
income taxation. λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes
relative to the scenario without transfers.
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to show significant welfare gains. Instead, if funding fiscal transfers could subject countries
to less harsher fiscal tightening than when they are hit by sovereign spread shocks, perhaps
then a fiscal transfer scheme could have better chances to impact positively on welfare.
Finally, the assumption that domestic government debt is held solely within the domestic
banking system might be considered rather strong in the context of the Euro area. In Table 5
I relax this assumption by setting the steady state share of government debt held domestically
to 90, 75 and 55%. To investigate the welfare consequences of fiscal transfers, I assume again
that domestic fiscal policy stabilizes the fiscal using lump sum transfers. Intuitively, the
more diversified the asset allocation in banks’ portfolios, the less are the welfare gains from
implementing fiscal transfers. In the extreme case of banks in the monetary union holding
equal shares of national governments debt, sovereign spread shocks in one regions would
equally affect both banking systems and both countries. Hence, both governments would be
in need to consolidate, since tax revenues would be falling in both countries. As a result,
with a diversified banking sector, a federal fiscal transfers scheme would not serve to improve
welfare nor stabilize the economy in response to idiosyncratic sovereign spread shocks.
6 Conclusion
The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has tested the resilience of the most ambitious
supra-national endeavour seen in the old continent. It has also reopened the discussion over
the design of a federal mechanism that can facilitate the adjustment of individual member
states facing large idiosyncratic shocks. The answers so far have been in the direction of more
integration and discipline, with the Banking Union and the Fiscal Compact being notable
examples. Looking ahead, however, the completion of a robust monetary union requires some
form of fiscal arrangement as well. After all, it was the inability of domestic fiscal policy to
tackle sovereign spread shocks in the countries most affected by the crisis that sparked the
severe tensions seen within the EMU.
The paper illustrates the mechanisms at work during a sovereign spread shock. The
model features financial frictions due to leverage constraints on banks, linking the availabil-
ity of credit to productive firms to the value of bank’s net worth. Because domestic banks
are exposed to sovereign credit risk, an exogenous unexpected increase in sovereign spreads
impairs credit provision to firms. The consequent recession is intensified due to fiscal consol-
idation, which is shown be more aggressive when sovereign spreads react to a deterioration
in public finances or for higher debt burdens,
I contribute to the debate about a future fiscal capacity at the EMU level by investigating
the welfare and stability implications of a simple fiscal transfer schemes between members of
a monetary union. Under the scheme, transfers are triggered when sovereign spreads widen,
therefore alleviating the budgetary strain on the government. Transfers can also provide a
stimulus to real activity by reducing the negative impacts of distortionary fiscal policy. When
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the domestic fiscal instrument is lump sum taxation, the proposed fiscal arrangements can
improve welfare. However, when domestic fiscal instruments are distortionary, fiscal transfers
still reduce economic volatility but are unable to improve welfare.
Further research should investigate the mechanisms by which these fragilities can be
reduced. Two extensions seem particularly relevant. First, one could consider asymmetric
domestic fiscal policy in the sense that the fiscal instrument used to stabilize the fiscal
stance could differ from the instrument used to fund the transfers. This has the potential to
lessen the distortionary costs of the transfer scheme and therefore to make transfers welfare
improving even in an environment where governments use distortionary taxation to stabilize
the fiscal stance. Second, one could assume that transfers, instead of going to the government,
are channelled to the banking sector. Credit provision to banks can reduce the contraction
of private lending to firms and mitigate the recession. It could also increase the welfare and
stability gains induced by a transfer scheme.
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Appendix
Table 6: Sensitivity: symmetric
Welfare
Θ = Dg = 0.5× 0.75× 1.25×
baseline 0.03 100% κT κT κT
κs 1,10 1,09 0,47 0,91 1,03 1,14
λce -0,36 -0,49 -1,95 -0,35 -0,35 -0,37
Δλce -39,42 -24,48 -13,71 -44,50 -42,71 -35,76
λm 0,08 -0,03 -0,60 0,09 0,09 0,07
Δλm -217,80 -63,64 -23,53 -205,08 -208,32 -229,85
λv -0,44 -0,47 -1,35 -0,44 -0,44 -0,45
Δλv -16,33 -19,91 -8,51 -18,71 -17,89 -14,66
Δσπ -1,44 -1,74 -0,42 -1,30 -1,44 -1,39
Δσgdp -9,06 -12,07 -5,42 -10,94 -10,15 -8,00
Δσc -15,75 -18,62 -9,87 -19,85 -18,05 -13,57
Δσl -16,24 -19,95 -8,14 -18,23 -17,63 -14,69
Δσz -32,45 -38,16 -10,27 -29,76 -32,68 -30,82
Ad Hoc
Θ = Dg = 0.5× 0.75× 1.25×
baseline 0.03 100% κT κT κT
κs 1,82 1,89 2,07 1,48 1,67 1,95
λce -0,45 -0,53 -4,12 -0,44 -0,44 -0,47
Δλce -24,69 -18,81 81,95 -30,50 -28,93 -19,66
λm -0,03 -0,08 -2,93 -0,01 -0,02 -0,04
Δλm -62,09 10,24 273,38 -84,45 -80,66 -31,03
λv -0,43 -0,45 -1,19 -0,43 -0,42 -0,43
Δλv -19,85 -22,20 -19,61 -21,83 -21,18 -18,42
Δσπ -1,73 -1,90 -0,98 -1,52 -1,69 -1,72
Δσgdp -10,63 -13,29 -11,79 -12,60 -11,74 -9,58
Δσc -19,42 -20,92 -23,49 -23,46 -21,62 -17,36
Δσl -19,59 -22,15 -18,34 -21,10 -20,72 -18,30
Δσz -37,54 -40,92 -22,44 -33,39 -37,04 -36,66
* 4.1025e-04. λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes relative
to the scenario without transfers.
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Table 7: Sensitivity: asymmetric (welfare)
Θ = Dg = 0.5× σσ = σσ =
baseline 0.03 100% κT −0.5 0.5
κs 1,10 1,01 0,54 0,93 1,10 1,10
λce,H -0,36 -0,10 -3,46 -0,36 -0,01 -0,72
Δλce,H -39,42 -87,57 -10,21 -43,38 -97,85 -14,12
λm,H 0,08 0,33 -2,19 0,10 0,27 -0,11
Δλm,H -217,80 -235,84 -10,87 -217,50 489,89 -40,83
λv,H -0,44 -0,43 -1,28 -0,45 -0,28 -0,61
Δλv,H -16,33 -24,50 -9,08 -16,87 -31,86 -6,64
λce,F -0,36 -0,78 1,06 -0,39 -0,01 -0,72
Δλce,F -39,42 82,65 7,49 -35,71 -97,85 -14,12
λm,F 0,08 -0,30 1,63 0,06 0,27 -0,11
Δλm,F -217,80 -377,37 2,14 -184,36 489,89 -40,83
λv,F -0,44 -0,48 -0,57 -0,45 -0,28 -0,61
Δλv,F -16,33 -10,05 -6,46 -15,20 -31,86 -6,64
ΔσπH -1,44 0,89 3,89 0,15 -4,15 -0,49
ΔσgdpH -9,06 -17,91 -10,63 -11,77 -20,19 -3,42
ΔσcH -15,75 -21,38 -14,04 -20,43 -31,16 -6,34
ΔσlH -16,24 -24,99 -7,97 -15,81 -31,70 -6,60
ΔσzH -32,45 -42,16 -12,68 -29,67 -49,94 -15,83
ΔσπF -1,44 -3,28 2,46 0,27 -4,15 -0,49
ΔσgdpF -15,75 -10,93 -5,02 -11,69 -31,16 -6,34
ΔσcF -9,06 -1,25 -1,30 -5,34 -20,19 -3,42
ΔσlF -16,24 -9,60 -6,70 -15,83 -31,70 -6,60
ΔσzF -32,45 -26,74 -18,28 -29,38 -49,94 -15,83
λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes relative to the scenario
without transfers.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1807
Table 8: Sensitivity: asymmetric (ad hoc)
Θ = Dg = 0.5× σσ = σσ =
baseline 0.03 100% κT −0.5 0.5
κs 1,82 1,32 1,61 1,23 1,82 1,82
λce,H -0,45 -0,09 -1,59 -0,32 -0,14 -0,76
Δλce,H -24,69 -89,40 -58,74 -48,93 -61,25 -8,85
λm,H -0,03 0,34 -0,43 0,12 0,11 -0,16
Δλm,H -62,09 -237,90 -82,42 -249,37 139,40 -11,66
λv,H -0,43 -0,42 -1,16 -0,44 -0,25 -0,60
Δλv,H -19,85 -26,23 -17,42 -18,42 -38,72 -8,06
λce,F -0,45 -0,82 -2,09 -0,47 -0,14 -0,76
Δλce,F -24,69 91,53 -312,31 -22,37 -61,25 -8,85
λm,F -0,03 -0,35 -1,51 -0,03 0,11 -0,16
Δλm,F -62,09 -419,04 -194,47 -58,79 139,40 -11,66
λv,F -0,43 -0,48 -0,58 -0,44 -0,25 -0,60
Δλv,F -19,85 -11,37 -5,24 -17,35 -38,72 -8,06
ΔσπH -1,73 1,47 15,58 0,99 -4,98 -0,59
ΔσgdpH -10,63 -19,26 -21,15 -12,78 -23,68 -4,01
ΔσcH -19,42 -22,71 -26,42 -21,87 -38,42 -7,82
ΔσlH -19,59 -26,75 -15,29 -17,29 -38,24 -7,96
ΔσzH -37,54 -45,78 -27,34 -33,48 -57,76 -18,31
ΔσπF -1,73 -3,06 9,85 1,32 -4,98 -0,59
ΔσgdpF -10,63 -0,63 4,53 -5,33 -23,68 -4,01
ΔσcF -19,42 -12,11 -6,87 -13,69 -38,42 -7,82
ΔσlF -19,59 -10,88 -4,24 -17,94 -38,24 -7,96
ΔσzF -37,54 -29,80 -29,71 -33,58 -57,76 -18,31
λce, λm and λv are stated in per mill. Δ are stated in percentage changes relative to the scenario
without transfers.
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